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Abstract 
This article examines the role of the European Commission in non-legislative policy co-ordination in 
the European Union. Using the Open Method of Co-ordination in the oft-neglected sector of cultural 
policy as a case study, it argues that rather than a neutral facilitator as it appears on paper, the 
Commission occupies both a political and administrative leadership role in the operation of the culture 
OMC. Through analysis of policy documentation, interview, and participant observation material, the 
article demonstrates how the Commission has operated as a key driver and agenda-setter in the field, 
exposing the inter-institutional dynamics in a competence in which the EU has a supporting role. The 
findings thus have broader implications for the study of agenda-setting and European integration in 
policy sectors where the EU holds a supporting competence. 
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This article examines the role of the European Commission in policy co-ordination using a 
case study of the Open Method of Co-ordination (OMC) in the field of cultural policy.1 The 
Commission, an institution ‘at the very heart of the EU system’ (Nugent, 2010, p. 105), has 
been the subject of much academic attention (see, for example, Kassim et al., 2013 for a 
recent overview). However, most of this literature focuses on its role in the Community 
method; its functions and responsibilities in non-legislative policy co-ordination have not 
been studied as extensively. Given that issues of competence, subsidiarity, legitimacy, and 
democracy are key in a post-Maastricht EU, agenda-setting dynamics between the 
Commission and Member States in areas of supporting competence are particularly important 
to study, as these “new” modes of governance occupy ‘an unsettled constitutional space’ 
                                                          
1 The European Union does not explicitly define cultural policy, but it is generally agreed to be policies 
associated with the arts and culture (including cultural institutions such as museums), communications and 
media (including, for example, broadcasting and publishing), citizenship and identity, and spatial culture (urban 
and cultural planning, and cultural heritage) (Craik, Davis, and Sunderland, 2000). 
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(Armstrong, 2008, p. 416).2 The central question this article asks is therefore what role does 
the European Commission play in the operation of the Open Method of Co-ordination in the 
field of culture? 
 
The OMC is a method of intergovernmental policy co-ordination that takes place primarily in 
policy areas where the EU has a supporting competence and where the subsidiarity principle 
is applied. While the literature on the OMC is extensive (see for example Borrás and 
Radaelli’s 2010 literature review), few studies have focused explicitly on the role of the 
European Commission within the OMC. As such, there is scope to focus more closely on 
inter-institutional dynamics in the OMC’s operation. Indeed, there is disagreement in the 
literature on whether non-legislative modes of governance such as the OMC empower the 
Commission or take away from it. Does the so-called “new intergovernmentalism” 
(Bickerton et al., 2015), whereby the European Council and Council of Ministers are in the 
driver’s seat, apply in the case of policy co-ordination as well?  
 
Agreeing with a wide body of literature on the Commission’s role in the Community method, 
some have argued that policy co-ordination tools such as the OMC have meant a decreased 
role for the Commission overall (Nugent, 2010), as political priorities are set in the Council, 
restricting the Commission’s role to one of an administrative nature. Others maintain that the 
Commission is able to drive the agenda. For example, Deganis (2006) has found that, in the 
case of the OMC in employment, the Commission has been a key driver of further 
integration. Souto-Otero et al.’s (2008, p.232) findings in the OMC in education and 
vocational training policy indicate that the Commission ‘has been active in extending its 
                                                          
2 “New” modes of governance, including the OMC, are characterized by their voluntary nature, reliance on 
multi-level networks, and civil society participation (see Héritier and Rhodes, 2010). 
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competences’ in the field. Meanwhile, in the field of social policy, several contributions have 
shown the key role that the Commission had played (see, for example, Cram, 1993; Hantrais, 
2007; Anderson, 2015). Linda Hantrais, for example, concluded that the Commission 
‘exploited the ambiguities and lack of precision in the treaties to take forward non-binding 
legislation and soft law’ in social policy (Hantrais, 2007, p.258). Similarly, Vollaard et al. 
(2016) found the Commission to be a driver of a European healthcare union. It is thus ‘not 
obvious’ that the OMC has weakened the Commission (Borrás and Jacobsson, 2004, p.198). 
 
Cultural policy is another sector to add to this growing body of work on the inter-institutional 
dynamics of policy co-ordination. A cultural competence was first introduced in the Treaty 
on European Union in 1992, though the Community was involved in the sector before this 
(see Craufurd Smith, 2004; Sassatelli, 2009; and Shore, 2000).3 Culture is a supporting 
competence: Member States retain control over their own cultural policies and the EU’s role 
is supplementary. The objective of the culture OMC is to provide a platform for Member 
States to share and exchange ideas based on commonly agreed policy priorities (Council of 
the European Union, 2007; Ecorys, 2013b). Cultural policy is an under-represented sector in 
EU policy studies, and one that Member States are ‘particularly disinclined’ (Littoz-Monnet, 
2007, p. 2) to transfer more powers in. It thus makes a good case study because of the 
controversy surrounding the degree and nature of the EU’s participation in this field 
(Craufurd Smith, 2004; Littoz-Monnet, 2007). 
 
The article first discusses the Commission within the EU political system, and then gives a 
brief overview of the EU’s involvement in cultural policy. The bulk of the paper is dedicated 
                                                          




to exploring the role of the Commission, framed around exposing the difference between 
what the Commission’s role in the OMC appears on paper and what actually happens in 
practice. Ultimately it finds that it is the Commission that has been the driver of further 
cooperation in EU cultural policy co-ordination, and that while the Council of Ministers acts 
as a “check” on the Commission’s power, the Commission is able to exert a great deal of 
influence over the entire process.  
 
The European Commission and policy co-ordination 
Most research on the role of the Commission in EU governance looks at its role within the 
Community method, whereby it can act as a policy entrepreneur.4 This body of literature has 
led to valuable insight into the way the Commission works, most notably with regards to its 
agenda-setting powers. However, there is still debate about the overall extent to which the 
Commission is able to “drive” the direction of the EU (Bickerton et al., 2015, p. 237). These 
issues concern the Commission’s legitimacy given its status as an unelected body as well as 
the division between bureaucratization and politicization (Coombes, 1970; Hooghe, 2002; 
Moravscik, 2002; Nedergaard, 2007; Wille, 2013).  
 
There is general agreement that the European Commission has become less powerful since 
the Maastricht Treaty, due to a combination of treaty changes, the aftermath of the Santer 
Commission’s actions, popular pressure to democratize policymaking, and pressure from 
Member States to act unilaterally on matters of the second and third pillars (see Kassim et al., 
2013, ch.5; Bickerton et al., 2015, introduction). However, this assertion is usually made in 
                                                          
4 Wallace and Wallace (2007) identify five different policy-making modes in the EU, each which ‘reveals 
differences in the roles and behaviour of the various key actors, in their variety of approaches to policy 
dilemmas, and in the diversity of instruments used’ (p. 341). 
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the context of policy sectors in which the EU has an exclusive or shared competence. What 
about supporting competences? In these, policy co-ordination is a key mode of governance. 
The OMC has been criticized for the potential to facilitate “competence creep” through 
‘soften[ing] up issues for some future EU grab for power, or because it seeks policy 
convergence but by means other than the constitutionalised legislative process’ (Armstrong, 
2008, p. 417). However, most of the OMC literature focuses on the outcomes and 
effectiveness of co-ordination, rather than how it operates. The Commission’s role is usually 
only mentioned in passing, typically in regards to its role of target monitoring and reporting 
(see, for example, de la Porte, 2002 and Nedergaard, 2005). There is also some work that has 
looked at the Commission’s co-ordination capacities more generally (see Jordan and Schout, 
2006). More consideration thus needs to be given to the role of the Commission in policy co-
ordination in order to more fully capture European integration and governance dynamics. 
 
The 2001 White Paper on EU Governance stipulates that ‘the Commission should be closely 
involved [in the OMC] and play a co-ordinating role’ (European Commission, 2001, p.18). In 
most policy fields, the Commission ‘presents proposals on the European guidelines, organises 
the exchange of best practices, proposes indicators and benchmarks, and provides support to 
the process of implementation, monitoring, and peer review’ (de la Porte, 2002, p. 44). These 
roles appear administrative in nature on paper, but as I argue throughout this article, they are 
political in nature: 
‘[c]onceputalising the Commission as disinterested [sic] authority that simply overlooks co-
ordinative initiatives taking place among Member States repudiates a substantial body of 
empirical work demonstrating how the Commission, since its inception, has continuously 
pushed to increase its powers within the EU and promoted a further integrationist agenda in 
line with its own interests’ (Deganis, 2006, p. 22-3). 
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Therefore, despite the intergovernmental nature of the OMC, it is still important to probe into 
the nature of the Commission’s role as the body responsible for facilitating and managing 
policy co-ordination in this sector. 
 
EU cultural policy co-ordination 
Culture is a competence that ‘entered the arena of EU jurisdiction under complex and 
contradictory conditions’ (Sarikakis, 2007, p. 14). The EU became involved in the field in the 
mid-1970s in order to emphasize a shared cultural heritage and sense of cultural identity to 
gain more popular support for European integration (Craufurd Smith, 2004; Mattocks, 2017). 
Aside from the polysemic and contested nature of the definition of culture, there is a large 
range of cultural policy traditions in individual Member States (Staiger, 2013). This pluralism 
means that the form and legitimacy of EU involvement in the field is not obvious (Staiger, 
2013). There are debates between and among Member States that wish to extend the 
competence and those that do not (Barnett, 2001; Littoz-Monnet, 2007), and policy 
harmonization is explicitly prohibited.  
 
The EU has three main responsibilities in the field: (1) to encourage and facilitate cooperation 
between Member States; (2) to promote the incorporation of culture into other areas of EU 
jurisdiction; and (3) to cooperate with Member States on cultural action (see European 
Commission, 2007, 2016). Culture is part of the Directorate-General for Education and 
Culture (DG-EAC). The DG oversees programs such as the European Capital of Culture, 
European Heritage Days, and European Union prizes for Literature, Architecture, and Music, 
and the EU-wide funding programme Creative Europe 2014-2020, among others (see 




In 2007, the EU launched the Agenda for Culture, which included the introduction of an 
OMC. This opened ‘a new chapter of cooperation on culture policy at European level’ 
(Ecorys, 2013b, p. 2). The OMC work is programmed through triennial Work Plans for 
Culture, which outline the EU’s strategic priority themes for the period concerned. To date 
there have been three Work Plans: 2008-2010, 2011-2014, and 2015-2018. The Work Plans 
are developed with the overarching goals of the Agenda for Culture and Europe 2020 in mind 
and are agreed on by Member States in the Council of Ministers. The Plans contain policy 
“priority areas” and subthemes within each priority area. Those subthemes that fall into the 
Member State domain operate with an OMC. Crucially, unlike most other policy fields, the 
culture OMC does not feature peer review, benchmarking, reporting, or “naming and 
shaming” based on targets and progress. It is thus an example of cooperative, rather than 
convergent co-ordination, with an emphasis on learning and exchange (Biagi, 1998; Ecorys, 
2013b).  
 
Within the body of work on EU public policy, there has not been much scholarly attention 
paid to policy-making in the cultural field, likely because it is often seen as a rather 
inconsequential policy area and has a comparatively low budget and impact (Gray and 
Wingfield, 2011). However, studies that do exist show that the Commission has played a key 
role in the development of EU action in this field, particularly since Maastricht. The work of 
Annabelle Littoz-Monnet (2007, 2012), for example, shows how the DG took an active 
stance in advancing further cultural action by framing culture as a tool to foster economic 
growth and competitiveness. Similarly, Patel (2013) argues that the Commission has 
exhibited ‘integration by interpellation,’ a technique of governmentality, to further deepen 
integration by facilitating debates on “Europeanness,” without actually defining the word. 
More recently, Littoz-Monnet (2015) has shown how successful DG-EAC has been at the 
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“creativity frame,” advancing the EU’s cultural policy agenda by promoting the economic 
potential of the cultural and creative industries, a shift from earlier discourses of shared 
identity that the EU emphasized in the early days of the competence (Shore, 2000).  
 
Theoretical and methodological frameworks 
To investigate the Commission’s role in cultural policy co-ordination, I adopt a sociological 
institutionalism theoretical framework and use a combination of research methods. This 
allows for a qualitative, in-depth approach that focuses on institutions, actors, and structure. 
In this perspective, actors are said to act according to the logic of appropriateness (March and 
Olsen, 2009). An extension of this concept is the logic of practices (Jenson and Mérand, 
2010), which links appropriateness with social norms and organizational practices. Agents 
are conceptualized as ‘conscious and reflexive actors embedded in a given (institutional and 
indeed social) context’ (Ripoll Servent and Busby, 2013, p. 6); thus, the concept of embedded 
agency (Ripoll Servent and Busby, 2013) reflects actions based on fit and appropriateness 
within a particular organizational setting. These in turn become routines that are reproduced 
in organizations (March and Olsen, 1989). This takes into account the importance of socially 
constructed roles influencing preferences, more so than individuals’ own preferences (From, 
2002). 
 
It is also important to address the importance of informal institutions, as the gaps between 
formal and informal rules and behaviour is a central part of the analysis below. Defined as 
‘socially shared rules, usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced 
outside of officially sanctioned channels’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 727), informal 
institutions can ‘shape even more strongly [than formal] political behaviour and outcomes’ 
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(Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p. 725).5 The full spectrum of political activity and its complex 
interactions and negotiations cannot fully captured by looking at formal institutions only; 
indeed ignoring informal aspects ‘risks missing much of what drives political behaviour and 
can hinder efforts to explain important political phenomena’ (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, p. 
726). This gap between formal organizational structure and day-to-day practices is indeed 
where much of the richness in studying institutions lies. 
 
By their very nature, informal behaviour and procedures are elusive; it is ‘an attempt at 
studying the invisible or at least the opaque’ (Christiansen and Neuhold, 2012, p. 2). This 
presents methodological challenges in that the researcher must understand a political system 
intimately in order to identify what is formal, what is informal, and most importantly expand 
on the relationship between them. Three types of information gathering – document analysis, 
semi-structured interviews, and participant observation – were used to study three OMC 
groups within the 2011-2014 Work Plan for Culture. These groups were in Priority A, 
‘Cultural diversity, intercultural dialogue, and accessible and inclusive culture,’ and worked 
on themes of access and diversity in public arts and cultural institutions (Council of the 
European Union, 2010). 30 semi-structured interviews were carried out among three different 
groups: EU officials in the Commission and Council of Ministers, Member State 
representatives who attended the OMC meetings as nationally-appointed experts, and invited 
external experts who gave presentations to the groups. I also observed a two-day meeting of 
one group.  
 
                                                          
5 Formal institutions, meanwhile, are defined as ‘rules and procedures that are created, communicated through 
channels widely accepted as official’ (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004, p.727). 
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After all information was gathered, a thematic analysis was carried out in three stages. I first 
identified broad themes that emerged from the transcripts and my notes from observation. In 
a second stage, I refined these themes more comprehensively based on associations between 
interviewees. I then looked for linkages across the themes, and began to identify illustrative 
examples in each theme. In a third phase, I began to further reflect on “before” fieldwork and 
“after” fieldwork reflections to determine how what I had found differed from what I had 
expected. Where applicable, I also corroborated findings with the 2013 evaluation on the 
OMC carried out by Ecorys on behalf of the Commission (Ecorys, 2013a, 2013b). 
 
Findings: the European Commission and the culture OMC 
The culture OMC was created by DG-EAC after being proposed by the Commission in the 
2007 Agenda for Culture (European Commission, 2007). It was then endorsed by the Council 
in a November 2007 resolution (Council of the European Union, 2007). That the suggestion 
of an OMC and its drive into being came from the Commission is important and telling: 
though the Commission is constricted by subsidiarity, the body has an interest in furthering 
EU cultural cooperation within its remit, as evidenced by this comment from an official in 
DG-EAC: 
We always try to push for more competence because […] at EU level we think that it’s a good 
way to go, […] it’s maybe not always so efficient to “go” only national at this stage, so we 
think that it’s good to co-ordinate more and more together, which of course doesn’t mean 
imposing anything, or deciding anything, just trying to co-ordinate maximum [sic] and 
harmonize what can be harmonized… (Corrine, personal communication, April 2014).6 
 
                                                          
6 All names are pseudonyms in order to protect anonymity. 
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Corrine’s statement outlines a cautiously activist stance: ‘push[ing] for more competence.’ At 
the same time, the Commission is also wary of treading on Member States’ toes, due to 
concerns about subsidiarity. While they might want to push an activist agenda, the 
Commission is constrained by the Council of Ministers, as Corrine explains further:   
… there was some reluctance to establish an OMC in culture. Some Member States didn’t 
want that. Now they are happy with it, but they are always very attentive to what we are doing 
and why, and any formulation that could give the impression that we’re trying to take the lead 
or do something is immediately raised and erased. Because of the subsidiarity principle 
(Corrine, personal communication, April 2014). 
 
The Commission’s formal role in the culture OMC, as outlined in the 2011-2014 Work Plan 
for Culture, is to,  
provide logistical and secretarial support to the work of the groups. As far as possible, it will 
support the groups by other suitable means (including studies relevant to their field of work) 
(Council of the European Union, 2010, p. 9). 
The key words in this description are logistical and secretarial. The emphasis in the Work 
Plan is a managerial, facilitative role. The word that is most used to describe the 
Commission’s role in the culture OMC by Commission policy officers themselves is 
secretariat. One policy officer is assigned to each OMC group, and follows that group from 
beginning to end. That individual is responsible for co-ordinating with Member States on the 
appointment of experts, co-ordinating with the groups’ chairs, organizing meetings, and 
distributing information to the group. One policy officer, Fatima, described her role as such: 
I hold the secretariat – all the basic administrative support, but also support in terms of 
contact. So my role is not only to disseminate information - the agenda, the minutes, all that - 
but give the group specific information on certain topics, […] reports, studies, and so on. I 
provide this to them. But the work is done by them (personal communication, May 2014). 
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The DG is also responsible for monitoring progress on the Work Plan as a whole; it produces 
both midterm and final evaluation reports (see European Commission, 2014).  
 
On paper, then, the Commission’s role appears to be limited – to facilitating and managing 
the OMC. It is also presented in a rather de-politicized fashion, because (political) policy 
priorities are set by Member States in the Council. However, while the publically-available 
descriptions of the Commission’s role gives some idea of what the DG is responsible for, it 
does not shed much light on how exactly the OMC works in practice. It is thus necessary to 
dig deeper into the day-to-day practices of facilitating policy co-ordination. Indeed, findings 
from my research point to a more developed role than the Commission’s (limited) role 
description in the Work Plan suggests: 
 
The word used is secretariat. I would suggest it’s slightly more (Jette, Commission, personal 
communication, May 2014).  
 
… the Commission – they’re doing much more than it’s written in the documents, where it 
says simply ‘secretariat,’ sending the emails, etc. They do a lot more (Viktoria, Member State 
expert, personal communication, October 2014). 
 
These quotes, from both a manager in the Commission as well as a Member State expert 
(who was also a former permanent representative in the Council), illustrate that what happens 
in practice is in fact more extensive. There are two main roles to explore here. The first is the 
DG’s overseeing and evaluation responsibilities, which affords it a “bird’s eye view” of the 
entire OMC process that no other actor within the OMC enjoys. The second is its day-to-day 
role in administering, facilitating, and managing the OMC. Taken together, these practices 
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exemplify the Commission as both a political and administrative leader in the culture OMC 
(Hix, 1998, p. 45-6). These roles are discussed in turn below. 
 
I. Overseeing and evaluation responsibilities 
The Commission has a unique overview of the entire OMC process that neither the Council 
nor the Member States enjoy. To explain, it is useful to draft a historical timeline, using the 
2011-2014 Work Plan as an example. First of all, the Work Plan is agreed on in the Council 
of Ministers. The Council, representing the Member States, is (in theory) ‘to be found at the 
top of the decision-making pyramid, setting the overall objectives to be achieved by the 
Union’ (de la Porte, 2002, p. 44). However, while the formal final decision on the Work Plan 
takes place in the Council, in practice, the Commission was found to play a strong role in its 
drafting and creation:  
I have to admit that a lot of the drafting work came from the Commission side, as a sort-of 
ghost writer. They drafted a lot, which was then amended by the presidency team, but not 
dramatically. It isn’t supposed to be like that! Because it’s a Council work plan, but in reality 
a lot of the preparation was done with intensive cooperation of the Commission [civil] 
servants (Darya, Member State representative, personal communication, April 2014). 
At any one time, the DG has the most knowledge of progress on the Work Plan: it has a 
‘cross-cutting view’ of the bargaining positions of other actors involved in the process 
(Kassim et al., 2013, p. 130). The Commission also has a keen sense of what will be accepted 
in the Council, since a Commission official is present at Council meetings (Corrine, 
Commission, personal communication, April 2014). It is therefore in a position to propose 
policy priorities and sub-priorities that it feels will be widely accepted. 
 
Secondly, the Commission is also responsible for monitoring progress during the period of 
the Work Plan, as well as disseminating OMC groups’ work to the Council and any other 
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relevant bodies (various personal communications, April and May 2014). After each OMC 
group is finished, the Commission co-ordinates the dissemination of the best practice policy 
report to the Council’s working committee on cultural affairs and other relevant EU-level 
stakeholders (other dissemination is undertaken in the Member States by the participating 
experts themselves).7 The chair of the OMC group presents the report to the working 
committee in the Council, and this is co-ordinated by the Commission policy officer in 
charge of that group (Corinne, Commission, personal communication, April 2014).   
 
Finally, at the end of a Work Plan cycle, the DG evaluates progress in preparation for the 
next plan. Slightly ironically, the institution of rotating presidencies, designed to make the 
Council more geographically representative, equal, and fair in terms of agenda-setting, has 
meant that the Commission’s role is increased: 
[W]e really feel that we’re holding all of that together as the Commission, because [Council] 
presidencies come and go. We have the overview of the Work Plan, and we feel a bit of an 
ownership (Jette, Commission, personal communication, May 2014). 
Therefore, due to their roles overseeing and evaluating the culture OMC, as well as a 
prominent role in drafting the Work Plan’s policy priorities, the Commission is at the centre 
of the overall political co-ordination of the culture OMC. 
 
II. Day-to-day management 
The second point to develop with regards to the Commission’s role is that the body is also 
responsible for the OMC’s day-to-day management. These tasks include scheduling 
meetings, taking notes during meetings, co-ordinating the appointment of Member State 
                                                          
7 Each OMC group produces a report composed of thematic best practice examples as well as some analysis. 
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experts, and supplying additional information when necessary, as Jette, a Commission 
official, outlines: 
… we also play a role in the management of the meetings in the sense that when they arrive, 
chairs are often quite new, often their first OMC meeting, so we explain what the OMC is, 
how it works, and […] we try to guide the management of the meeting (personal 
communication, May 2014). 
 
Expanding on that, Jette explained the unique ‘European’ perspective that the Commission’s 
policy officers bring to the OMC groups: 
… the people in charge of assisting the groups […] have a deep knowledge of the policy. 
They also have a European overview – which Member States don’t always have. […] So we 
bring in this knowledge and we are able to advise the chairs (Jette, Commission, personal 
communication, May 2014) 
Jette’s comment is interesting for two reasons. The first is her assertion that the policy 
officers have a ‘European overview.’ This suggests that the Commission views itself as a 
body that is privileged because of its overseeing role; in other words, there is value to be 
added at a European level and the Commission is working for the ‘greater good’ of the 
Union.8 The Commission is in the best position to have an idea of how consensus can be 
achieved. Secondly, by advising and providing information (such as statistics, reports, and 
current research on various policy topics), the Commission is in effect acting as a gatekeeper, 
passing on the information as they see appropriate. No other member of the group has the 
resources to do so, putting the Commission in a position to influence the direction of the 
groups, as the experts often rely on this information a great deal. 
                                                          
8 Results from Kassim et al.’s (2013) major survey of Commission staff finds support for this view of the 
Commission: 79 per cent surveyed felt that Member States should not have a grip on decision-making, and 79.8 




Interestingly, the role of the group’s chair (an expert from a Member State elected by the 
group) was found to be crucial with regards to how much the Commission was involved: a 
strong chair with considerable organizational skill and capacity means that the Commission 
rarely has to intervene in the meetings; conversely, a weak one means that the Commission 
plays a stronger role in their operation. Wasil, one Member State expert, described his 
experience as such:  
…at the last meeting [the Commission] took […] a big role in steering us; I guess they saw 
that if they don’t, it will be a report with no target group. They were kind of editors, which I 
guess was good. Some of us wanted to be stronger in some recommendations, and they said 
that that’s not our role. There was a discussion within the group what [the Commission’s] 
mandate was, what our mandate was. In the end it was clear to me that they weren’t only 
facilitating but also had the final say (personal communication, October 2014). 
Wasil’s comments demonstrate just how much influence the Commission can have. In one 
group studied, the Commission officer even wrote most of the final report (typically, this is 
done or at least co-ordinated by the elected chair of the group). Interestingly, findings from 
other OMCs are similar; writing in the case of the employment OMC, Deganis (2006, p. 29) 
found that ‘[w]hereas a strong Chair will direct Committee proceedings a weak Chair will 
inevitably allow the Commission to assert itself as a dominant actor within EMCO.’9  
 
                                                          
9 Deganis also includes a quote from one of her interviewees, an official within DG-Employment, who said 
‘…the role of the Commission is sometimes co-chair and sometimes more behind the scenes’ (2006, p.35, note 
#20). Though I only concentrated on three groups within the 2011-2014 Work Plan, I expect this finding to be 
the case regardless of the thematic content of other culture OMC groups, as all of the policy officers I spoke to 
had worked in other priority areas as well. 
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Taken together, these informal practices show that the Commission’s role is far more 
developed than what might be expected from simply analyzing documents. No other actor in 
the process has as much knowledge of or involvement in the OMC at any one time than the 
Commission. Findings therefore demonstrate that the Commission occupies both a political 
and administrative leadership role in the operation of the culture OMC: 
 
 




The findings above show that European Commission sits at the epicentre of cultural policy 
co-ordination in the EU. The Commission created the Open Method of Co-ordination in this 
field and is responsible for its day-to-day operation and overall management. While on paper 
it would appear that the Council of Ministers takes ownership of the OMC, in practice, the 
process is steered by the Commission. But what ramifications does this have? 
 
First of all, the Commission is able to influence the process through its various roles in 
drafting of the content of the Work Plan, its overseeing responsibilities, and its daily 
management responsibilities. This central role is thus one that enables it to set terms of 
reference, socializing the OMC’s actors ‘to internalize its conception of issues and 
objectives’ (de la Porte, 2002, p. 44). The OMC is not a neutral activity; as a tool of policy 
co-ordination, it ‘privilege[s] certain actors and interests and exclude others; […] [and] 
drive[s] forward a certain representative of problems’ (Lascoumes and Le Gales, 2007, p. 9). 
There is thus a blurring of the administrative and the political. The Commission derives its 
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legitimacy based on its apoliticism. However, in practice it is involved in political decisions 
(see table 1).  
 
In a competence such as culture, this raises fundamental questions concerning subsidiarity. 
After all, ‘[l]egally speaking, it is not for the EU to take the lead or to control’ in this sector 
(Sandell, 1996, p.271). The Commission’s responsibilities regarding the provision of 
information also aids in ‘shaping of cognitive frames, […] one of the most powerful 
instruments of rule’ (Piattoni, 2010, p. 98). The themes the groups work on ‘represent a 
powerful learning instrument, insofar as they are expected to destabilise prior understandings 
of issues and thus lead to incremental changes via an ideational shift in framing policy 
problems’ (de la Porte and Pochet, 2012, p. 340). This makes the Commission an influential 
actor in the culture OMC. 
 
Secondly, we can also draw conclusions regarding agenda-setting and inter-institutional 
dynamics. As formal guardians of the treaty, the Commission’s first responsibility is 
consideration for the principle of subsidiarity, which was repeated by many of the policy 
officers I spoke to. In the cultural field, this taken seriously due to the sensitivity of the 
competence. However, the Commission has pushed, perhaps tentatively at times, for further 
co-ordination in the field since the early 1990s (Littoz-Monnet, 2012). While the 
Commission’s policy officers say that they are facilitating and adding value, it is apparent 
that they believe that more can be done in terms of EU cultural cooperation, and have 
advanced an agenda that aspires to this. 
 
This naturally raises the question of the Council’s role, which, has been typically 
acknowledged in the small body of literature on EU cultural policy to be more restrained and 
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resistant to further cooperation (Gordon and Adams, 2007; Littoz-Monnet, 2012). Here, we 
need to distinguish between power and influence (Golub, 1996). Ultimately, the Council still 
has the “final say,” and it has agreed to further cooperation in the form of the OMC, with the 
knowledge that policy harmonization is prohibited in the treaty. However, while the Council 
retains power regarding the priorities of policy co-ordination, the Commission’s influence 
diminishes the role of the Member States, due to the amount of bargaining and compromise 
involved. Though it could be argued there is not much “at stake” in these discussions given 
the peripheral nature of the competence, the setting of these policy priorities is important 
given concerns about subsidiarity in this field. The Commission may even ‘take risks in order 
to push a certain position’ (Bache et al., 2015, p. 335), knowing that it has certain allies 
within the Council working party, or indeed in the cultural sector itself. The Council’s way of 
working, operating as it does on the basis of consensus, has the effect of constraining 
viewpoints on either side, appealing to a middle ground, which means a loss of power for 
individual Member States (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998). The Commission is in a position to 
influence this process.10  
 
This lends support to the view that ‘the Commission [has] routinely produced rules and 
policies that the member government would not have adopted though intergovernmental 
bargaining’ (Sandholtz and Stone Sweet, 2012, p. 22). While my findings do not indicate that 
the OMC has allowed the Commission to “bypass” the subsidiarity principle (Borrás and 
Jacobsson, 2004, p. 198), it has allowed the Commission to expand its influence in cultural 
policy. Setting aside debates about the effectiveness of the OMC (see for example Kröger, 
2009; Lodge, 2007), the paradox here is that the “rubber-stamping” nature of the Council’s 
                                                          
10 This is because, as actors become socialized to European ways of doing things, there is a blurring of national 
and transnational interests (Beyers and Dierickx, 1998; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2001). 
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role is in fundamental opposition to the initial reason that many Member States were in 
favour of the OMC – because it reduced the role of the Commission, eliminated the 
Parliament entirely, and put the Council of Ministers at the epicentre of policy co-ordination 
(Lodge, 2007). But this is not quite what has happened in the case of the culture OMC. 
 
If it were not for the Commission, would a culture OMC exist? All evidence points to “no,” as 
the impetus for implementing an OMC came from the Commission and policy co-ordination 
has been steered by them since (European Commission, 2007). Advancing an agenda that 
promotes deeper cultural integration is in fact a norm for the European Commission (Awesti, 
2007; Bulmer, 1993). These findings appear to be at odds with the view that the European 
Commission of the twenty-first century is a ‘citadel under siege’ (Kassim et al., 2013). 
Certainly, this is the case in many areas of EU competence (Bickerton et al., 2015). However, 
as I have shown, it is also important to look at integration dynamics in policy sectors where 
the EU has a supporting competence and determine to what extent the Commission is in the 
driver’s seat (Schmidt and Wonka, 2012). Results from this research indicate a prominent 
role for the Commission and, to some degree, a loss of power and influence of the Member 
States. This deepens our understanding of dynamics in this field but it also raises important 
questions about the extent to which this is also the case in other supporting competences, and 




This article set out to examine the role of the European Commission in cultural policy co-
ordination. It objective was to expose the differences between formal and informal 
institutions in co-ordination, demonstrating the value of insider work that looks closely at 
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what goes on “behind the scenes,” and in doing so to scrutinize inter-institutional dynamics in 
a supporting competence where policy co-ordination is the primary policy-making mode. 
While the Commission has been the subject of a great degree of research, much of this has 
been on its role in the Community method. Similarly, within the study of the OMC itself, 
only rarely is the Commission’s role an explicit focus; rather, the literature tends to 
concentrate on the impacts (or lack thereof) of the OMC at the national level. However, 
looking at the roles of EU institutions is crucial – even more so in the case of policy co-
ordination where the policy areas in contention are those that the EU does not have full 
competence in. What are the politics of consensus (Deganis 2006)? And where does the drive 
for increased co-ordination come from at this level? As an under-researched policy field and 
one that has unique challenges in terms of its symbolism, cultural policy offers an interesting 
test case to explore these dynamics. 
 
The OMC has ‘too often been presented as a technical, quasi apolitical policy-making tool’ 
(de la Porte and Pochet, 2003, n.p.). This paper has interrogated some of these ‘politics of 
consensus’ and has demonstrated that the European Commission’s role in the culture OMC is 
one that is more developed and stronger than what might be expected from formal EU 
documentation. Not only does the DG play a strong hand in drafting the policy priorities – a 
role that, on paper, appears exclusively in the domain of the Council – it also has input into 
the final policy reports, ‘structures the framework in which different players are to interact, 
and contributes to the structuring of the discourse through the documents it prepares’ (de la 
Porte, 2002, p. 44). The Commission ultimately ‘enjoys a superior political presence and 
visibility’ and also ‘is in a better position than others to manage the content and the directions 




These findings cannot be extrapolated to broader comments on European integration due to 
the sector-specific nature of inquiry. However, they can lend support to existing positions 
(From, 2002) and have demonstrated that a deeper understanding European integration can be 
achieved by examining the day-to-day dynamics of policy-making and the relationship of 
institutions within the process (Cram, 1994). Although it is restricted by the principle of 
subsidiarity, when policy co-ordination action is taken, it is the Commission that takes the 
lead. Findings therefore demonstrate that the Commission’s ‘logic of practices’ is in fact to 
take an activist stance, within its remit, and to advance further European policy co-ordination 
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List of interviews 
All names are pseudonyms. 
 
 
Alfred 14 April 2014 Council of Ministers official In person, Brussels 
Beatrice 14 April 2014 Council of Ministers official In person, Brussels 
Corinne 15 April 2014 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Darya 22 April 2014 Sub-national government representative In person, Brussels 
Edward 24 April 2014 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Fatima 20 May 2014 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Georg 22 May 2014 Member State expert  In person, Brussels 
Hanna 22 May 2014 Member State expert In person, Brussels 
Jette 23 May 2014 European Commission official In person, Brussels 
Luise 4 June 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Markus 16 June 2014 
Member State expert  Telephone 
Nils 24 June 2014 
Member State expert Telephone 
Oskar 27 June 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Paulina 30 June 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Quentin 11 July 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Ruth 14 July 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Salma 28 July 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Timo 18 Sept. 2014 Member State expert  Telephone 
Ulla 6 Oct. 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Viktoria 13 Oct. 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Wasil 17 Oct. 2014 Member State expert Telephone 
Julita  17 Oct. 2014 Member State expert  Telephone 
Yvette 5 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Zafar 6 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Alain 11 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Bartek 14 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Camilla 14 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Delores 21 Nov. 2014 Invited guest expert Telephone 
Elin 
Oct./Nov. 
2014 Invited guest expert 
Email 













Table 1: Summary of DG-EAC’s roles 
 
Political Administrative 
 Drafting the Work Plan; 
 Monitoring progress of policy priorities 
in the Work Plan; 
 Aiding Member States in the 
appointment of participating experts; 
 Writing the report;* 
 Evaluating progress of the Work Plan in 
general; 
 Disseminating groups’ outputs to the 
Council’s Cultural Affairs Committee. 
 
*Note that this role was only performed once in 
the three OMC groups studied. 
 
 Organizing meetings; 
 Taking notes at OMC meetings; 
 Distributing minutes;  
 Distributing material such as case study 
information, studies, and other such 
reports 
 
 
 
